INTERESTING EUROPEAN NEWS

STEAMSHIPS SAINT LOUIS AND AFRICA

The Loss of the Steamship North Carolina

THE TURKISH VIEW OF THE FOUR POINTS.

Recruiting in the United States for the British Army,

The French Emperor's Exposition of the Cri-

mean Expedition. &c.,

THE NEWS BY THE ST. LOUIS. The steamship St. Iouis, which left Havre on 11th instant, arrived at this port yesterday morning. The St. Louis left Cowes at 8 A. M. on Thursday, April

12, and arrived at Sandy Hook at 12 midnight on the 26th April—passage 13 days 16 hours. She brings 200 tons merchandise, French and Swiss goods, and 75 passengers, among them are Madame de

of the Italian opera, engaged by Mr. Niblo. Her news has been anticipated by the arrival of the

Africa at Halifax.

In consequence of there being a general holiday at Havre on the 10th, the St. Louis did not leave that port until late in the day of the 11th. Having taken on board

her English mails and passengers at Cowes, she left for New York at 6 o'clock on the morning of the 12th. The United States mail steamship Hermann, Captain Higgins, en route from New York to Bremen, arrived at Southampton on the evening of the 7th instant.

The American new screw steamship North Carolica, from Philadelphia to Liverpool, has been lost in the English channel, by coming in contact with the ship Robert, which left Liverpool for New Orleans on the 5th instant. The Robert came in contact with the North Carolina about thirty miles west of Taskar light, striking her on the port side, forward of the fore rigging, which caused her to fill immediately, and she sunk in about ten minutes. The captain and twenty one of the crew were taken on board the Robert and conveyed back to Liverpool. The remainder of the eleven men were seen in the boats alongside another ship at daylight Beyond the loss of her cutwater, the Robert sustained little or no injury. The collision took place at 1 A. M. on the

The American ship John Rutledge, from New York, arrived at Liverpool on the 6th instant, having lost two men overboard and suffered from bad weather on the

Arrangements were being made in London and other places for the purpose of testifying respect to the Emperor and Empress of the French, when they arrive in England, on the intended visit to her Majesty. At a court of the Common Council in London, it was determined to provide an entertainment suitable to the dignity of the city, to be held at the Guildhall, to which the Emperor and Empress are to be invited.

Letters from Athens contain deplorable accounts of the progress of brigandage in various parts of Greece. To such an extent bas it proceeded that some foreign influence of a detestable character is supposed to be at

General de la Marmora was about to establish his headquarters at Genoa, from whence the embarkation of the Piedmontere contingent will proceed as rapidly as pos-

alightly wounded. Capt. Montague was also a prisoner, but was not wounded. There were alarms on the 24th and 28th ult , but nothing important took place. It was expected that the fire upon Sebastopol would open in the course of that week.

The Wanderer of Vienna, of the 5th, says:-The Consula-General of France and England, who have returned to Bucharest, after a prolonged absence, hoist-ed their flags on the 25th ult, and thus indicated in official style that the cipiomatic relations between those Powers and the government of Waslachia were re-estab-ished.

Instructions of the Ottoman Plenipotentiary at the Vienna Conference.

The Paris Pays gives as follows the text of the instructions with which the Ottoman government has farnished its ambassador at Vienna, as to his conduct in the conference:—

ference:—
As soon as your Excellency anabunced that Prince
Gortchatoff, in the name of his government, had accepted the four guarantee points, with the interpretation assigned to them by the three Powers, it was notified to your Excellency, by order of his imperial Majesty, that you should attend the conferences about to be opened, but that you should discuss the questions raised merely

Ad referendum.

The conditions of the future peace are in fact of too vital importance for the Sublime Forts to permit of their being decided without the greatest circumspection and the maturest reflections on our part. It will only be after a long and minute examination of those conditions and the questions of right connected with them, as likewise of the elements of their practical application—It will only be when everything shall have been concerted with our alives, that our plenipotentary at Vienna can be furnished with precise and definite instructions. Nevertheless, as it is requisite that your Excellency should have a tew succinct instructions, to which you can aliept your language as the occasion may require, we import to you the following general indications:—

When the time shall have arrived for giving a complete definition of the four articles, and drawing up a pian for a treaty of peace, the Sublime Porte having the indisputable right to be heard both on the principles that constitute its basis and on their practical consequences, it is indispensable that this plan should be submitted to our consideration before it shall be proposed to Russis for her acceptance, and that we should first discuss it with the alied Powers, with the view of arriving at one common resolution.

This mode of proceeding is too natural to admit of a doubt respecting the adhesion of the representatives of those Powers on this subject. Nevertheless, by way of additional precaution, and to obviate any future misunderstanding or difficulty, your Excellency will on this point enter into formal explanations with Count Buol. Lord Westmoreland, and Earon Bourquency, and you will transmit to us the result.

Let us now proceed to the four articles above mentioned.

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In the first it would be incumbent, when abolishing Russia's protectorate over Wallachia and Moldavia, that the rights granted by the Porte to these two Principalities, as also to Servia, should be established in one organic law, and placed under the guarantee of the great Powers. On this article there are numerous other important observations to be made, which deserve the attention of the allies. In the the first place, they should not be left under the erroneous impression, which appears to exist, that a real protectrate has ever been grasted to Russau by virtue of treaties concerning the Danubish previnces. All that results from those treaties may be reduced to an assurance given to Russia, that the institutions established in these provinces should be neither modified nor destroyed. But under the pretext of neighborhood and similarity of religion, Russia, as is well known, without the slightest respect for existing institutions, and by a great privarion of engage means, sought marely to gain her own ends and satisfy her own private interests, as the conduct of the Russian consuls, in arrogating a de facto sovereignty at Jassy and Bucharest, has at all times proved its therefore meet that the guarantee of the Powers should be clearly defined and explained, so that, without at all interfering with the internal condition and administration of the Principalities it may confine itself appropriately to securing their privileges from destruction, and their existing institutions from encroachment. It is equally essential to constitute the precognities of the princes governing these provinces, so that they may not indirectly trench upon the sovereign rights of the Porte. For the rest, farther and more appears instruction of the Panube Eugsta hy he concerning the

Porte. For the rest, farker and more special instructions will be sent to your Excellency on this last named point.

With respect to the second article, concerning the question of the Danube, Russia, by her assumption of rights appertaining to the Sublime Ports on various fluvial points of the river, bas given rise to numerous and serious difficulties as to its free navigation. It will be necessary for us to explain on our side our observations respecting the means of both saleguarding the navigation of the Danube, and maintaining intact the right's not the Sublime Porte along the banks of this river.

The third article relates to the ravision of the treaty of July 13, 1841, with the view of connecting the existence of the Ottoman empire more closely with the equilibrium of Europe, by putting an end to the predominence of Russia in the Black Sea. The Subbime Porte, grateful for the display of sinters friendship which the great Powers intend bestowing on her in this matter, approves of the material means by which these Powers are desirous of virtually terminating the Russian preponderance. But it is at the same time the duty of the Sublime Porte to take good heed that the revision of the treaty of 1841 be not couched in terms capable of infinging on its rights of sovereignty in the Bosphorus and Dardanelies, or over any other part of its territory where the safety of the empire might possibly be ondaniered.

Finally, on arriving at the fourth article, since the repose and welfare of all the subjects of the Ottoman empire are of paramount interest for the Sublime Ports, it has for this object assured to all its Darislan subjects in the most solemn and public manner the enjoyment of

the rights and ancient privileges accorded to them by the Sultans who were the predecessors of his present Majesty, as likewise those recently conceded by his gracious imperial will and pleasure. In again declaring before all the world that he has no intention whatever of encroaching upon or diminishing those rights, his imperial Majesty doubts not at the same time that, on the part of the allied and friendly Powers, they will continue to deem as an object of the highest importance that whatever concerns the internal administration of the subject of the empire should not be the subject of any atipulation not compatible with the independence of the Sublime Porte (an independence which these very allied Powers have declared their wish to protect against the encreachments of Russia.) It is on that account that the Sublime Porte will, in concert with his allies, reject any attempt on the part of Prince Gortcbakoff to obtain the insertion into the treaty of peace of any guarantying clause whatever by which the full integrity of its independence may be exposed to encreachment.

Such teing the general views of the Sub ime Porle concerning the four articles in question, his imperial Majesty's pleasure is that they shall serve as a guide for regulating your Excellency's conduct, and it is for this serve the such that these instructions have been communicated to you.

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British Recruiting in the United States.

[From the London Times, April It.]

The comments of the American Journals upon the schemes said to be adopted in the States for raising a foreign legion in aid of our operations against Russis, furnish some remarkable illustrations of trans-Atlantic character, and give a considerable insight, if the representation can be altogether trusted, into the views of the American population, as well as into the opinions maintained with respect to the war. The recent proceedings of the Know Nothing party will have given the reader a general idea of the distinctions subsisting between one great class of American ettizens and another—between the native born Americans and those very numerous immigrants who, from all countries of Europe, have been poured year after year into the United States. It would certainly have been thought a curious speculation some time ago to inquire what response was likely to be mare if these classes had been severally invited to enlist in the service of Great Britain sgainst Russia, but to such inquiry we now seem to get some reply in the reports and observatious before us. It is said that among the native born citizens of the States there really exists a strong Russian feeling, or, as we understand the expression, a positive sympathy with the cause of Russia, as opposed to that of the allies. On what grounds, or by what arguments, such a pro-rence could be justified we should, if we gave credit to the assertion, be at considerable loss to comprehend, but we must need say that we disbelieve the fact. We can certainly imagine that Russia, as being in no respect a rival or compution of the Auguster and the appreciation of the agreement which a government like that of the Cara might be able directly or indirectly to put forward. It bas always been the essence of Russian policy to bespeak connivance by offesting concessions, and, as the America

in blood, larguage and institutions—must be in unison with our own, and that the true sympathies of the States must needs go with their own flesh and blood, fighting for liberty against despotism.

However, contiting this point, we are nevertheless assured that in spite of all alleged Russian tendencies, there was a considerable disposition among the native Americans to take service under our flag, if judicious measures had been devised for bringing such a result to pass. In the first piace, the failure of the "filibustering" expeditions recently projected had thrown loose a number of adventurous spirits, who were so eager for martial occupation that, if it were not procurable in one place, they would accept it in another besides which, it is said that the general unstradiness of the people, their addiction to novelities, and their constitutional love of excitement, would have irsured a large supply of recruits. Not a word, however, is mentioned about any sympathy with the principles at state; on the contrary, it is intimated that the motives actualing the volunteers would be based neither upon prospects of a recompense nor any particular fee lings of smity, but would be confined mainly to curiosity, pugnacity, and the desire of change. An opportunity would be oldered of seeing foreign lands and something like good fighting at the same time, and this temptation would have been sufficient. Americans would have been good fighting at the same time, and this temptation would have been sufficient. Americans would have been good fighting at the same time, and this temptation would have been sufficient. Americans would have been good fighting and the same time, and this temptation would have been sufficient. Americans would have been good fighting at the same time, and this temptation would have been sufficient. Americans would have been good for the continuent and acceptance of the first of the class—Germas, Helseiners, &c.—would be well disposed to the service—all the more so, indeed, from the late pressure of the t

as as as the temper of the people goes, a strong legion could be raised in the United states for co operation against Russia with exceedingly little difficulty. "It is apparent," indeed, says one paper, "that 10,000 men could be speedily furnished;", and no question can be entertained as to the general excellence of the soldiers thus to the forthcoming. The courage, intelligence, and activity of the Americans are well known, and toose indefatigable energies which hurry them over a whole continent in quest of excitement or occupation would find ample scope in the contingencies of such a war as that now raging. On the other side, the German immigrants, having been, for the most part, inured to military disciblice, possessing in some cases, probably a practical knowledge of arms, and being generally of mature age and vigot, would supply exactly the class of troops which are most in request at present. It is not that Great Britain is destitute of men or that the sources of recruiting have been exhausted by a twelvemonth's campaign. On the contrary, our recruiting procee's most successfulls; but it he piens that, whereas soldiers are wanted immediately, it takes two years or so to form a soldier, and to transform the willing lad into the robust and disciplined soldier. We should have little difficulty in raising \$1,000 men for the year 1855, but they are wanted for the year 1855. As the cause in which we are fighting is a common one, there can be no reason why we should not accept the cooperation of otters wherever it can be lawfully obtained, and, if the Americans can show us the way to take Schutopol, we should be quite ready to learn, and to give them every credit for the lesson.

The Curard steamship Africa arrived at her dook Boston at a quarter past 8 o'clock yesterday worning making the run from Halifax in thirty one hours. She was just too late to save the early train for New York, the mails therefore leave in the afternoon, reaching

New York early this morning.

Soon after leaving Halifax, a cabin passenger missel £600 sterling, and it is supposed the money was stolen. On the Africa's arrival at Boston, no communication was allowed with the ship, and a general search of the pas

sengers took place.

The robbery on board the steamer amounted to £500 sterling in gold, also Bank of England notes and jewelry -making in all about £1,500 sterling. The property belonged to Mr. E Collingwood, one of the passengers

The English papers contain very little news additions ed from Halifax. A despatch from Dover, dated 13th instant, states that the Neptune, 120 gurs, Rear Admiral Cochrane, with twelve sail of the fleet, were moored in Dover Bay, awaiting the arrival of the Imperial visiters from France.

The Expedition to the East. The Moniteur of April 11 contains the following ar

The Expedition to the East.

The Moniteur of April II contains the following article:

It is the incontestable right of a great country like France to know the truth when it interests the honor, the security, and the power of the State II is the sacred daily of a strong government like that of the Emperor to make known the truth when silence is not imposed by the patriotism of that public welfare. The expedition to the East, its causes, its object, the military operations prepared to support it are at present facts for discussion previously to becoming pages of history. That these facts may be usefully discussed and sariously judged, we shall now expose them with the most scrupulous exactitude. This appears to us both loyal and useful. Public opinion is prompt to take azam, sate easily len into error in the midst of emotions and events like those of which each day it experiences the counterblow. The best way of reassuring it is to enlighten it.

How was the expedition to the East conceived? On what provisions and data was its plan formed? What were the causes that modified it? Why tidd the Anglo Frinch army land in the Crimes, instead of acting on the Danube and making a camdaign in Bessarabia? How are we to explain the long resistance of the besieged in presence of the ardour and heroism of it be besieged? Such are points which we purpose examining in the first past of this task. In this examining we shall only deal with acknowledged facts, anthended documents, truths of science and of military history.

The imperious and decisive circumstancet which bid France draw the sword after a forty years' page a are present to every mitd. Russia, not being able to make Turkey accept her supremacy by the terror of her protocole, attempted to awe her by force. She fore up treaties, invaded a territory, disdained and threatened Rurope. Her armies occupied the Principalities, were advancing on the Danube, and marked out altrayd the stations for a victorious march over the listans. The

acmirable spirit displayed by the Yurkish nation did not suffice to disconcert this plan. Rus dis, it is true, found an unexpected obetacle in the heroit devotion of a people whom she had thought sunk in de cay, and the resistance of which made it remember that it had vanquished Peter the Great.

But the struggle was unequal. The whole world, parting with emotion, anxiously awsited the result. Germany, halting between the customs of the Holy Alliance and its signify, could not make up its mind whether it was to suffer any longer the arrogance of that dow instinon which weighed upon it, or whether it was to suffer any longer the arrogance of that dow instinon which weighed upon it, or whether it was to throw it off at last. It was from the West that the signal of resistence was given. France and England, loyally united, did not hesitate to send their arranes and their ficets into the East, there to defend the integrity of the Ottoman empire, the respect for treaties, the balance of power, and the civilization of Europe.

The firm will which presides over the government of our country, and which had resolved upon this war a a necessity for its honor, having in vain attempted the prevent it by an honorable conciliation, then drew unstructions for the illustrious Marshal to whose hand the sword of France was to be intrusted. These in structions, which bear the date of the 12th of April, 1864, contained the following passages:

** In placing you, Marshal, at the head of a Frence army, to fight at a cistance of more than 600 Isaque from our mother country, my first recommendation is to have a care for the health of the troops, to spare them as much as possible, and to give battle only after having made sure first of, at least, two chances out of three for a favorable result.

The perinsula of Gallipoli is adopted as the principal point of disembarcation, because it must be, as a strategical point, the basis of our operations; that is to say, the place of a favorable result.

The perinsula of Gallipoli is adopted as t

right.

If, revertheless, there abould be the intention of fortifying the line from Kara-su, in front of Constantinopte, it should only be done with the intention of leaving its defence to the Turks alone, for, I repeat it, our position would be more independent, more resdoubtable, when on the flanks of the Russian army, than if we were blockaded in the Thracism peninsuls.

The first point established, and the Anglo French army once united on the shores of the Sea of Marmora, you must concert measures with Omar Pashs and Lord Raglam for the adoption of one of the three following plans:—

1. Either to advance to meet the Russians on the Dallags.

1- Either to advance to meet the Russians on the Dalbans.
2. Or to seize upon the Crimea.
3 Or to land at Ocessa, or on any other point of the Russian coast of the Black Ses.
In the first case, Varna appears to me the most important point to be occupied. The infautry might be taken there by sea, and the cavalry more carelly, perhaps, by land. On no account ought the army to go too far from the Black Sea, so as to be always in free communication with its fleet.

there by sea, and the cavalry more easily, perhaps, by land. On no account ought the army to go too far from the Black Sea, so as to be always in free communication with its fleet.

In the second case, that the occupation of the Crimea, the place of landing must first be made sure of, that it may take place at a distance from the enemy, and that it may be speedly fortified, so as to serve as a point d'oppus to fall back upon in case of a retreat.

The capture of Sebastopol must not be attampted without at least half a siege train, and a great number of sacks for earth. When within reach of the place, do not omil seizing upon Balaklava, a little port situated about four leagues south of Sebastopol, and by means of which easy communications may be kept up with the fleet during the siege.

In the third case. In y principal recommendation is never to divide your army: 10 march always with all your troops united, for 40,000 compact men ably commanded are always an imposing force; divided, on the contrary, are nothing.

If compelled ou account of scarcity of provisions, to divide the army, co so in such manner as always to be able to unite it on one point within twety-four hours.

If, when marching, you form different columns, establish a common relying point at some distance from the enemy, that none of them may be attacked singly.

If you drive back the Russians, do not go beyond the lanube, unless the Austrians enter the lists.

As a general rule, every movements must be concerted with the legish Commander-in-Chief. There are only certain exceptional cases where the safety of the army mish the concerned, when you might act on your own resolution.

If place perfect confidence in you, Marabal; I am sure you will follow these instructions faithfully, and you will know how to add a new glory to that of our eagles.

From the shove extract from the Empéror's instructions to Marabal de St. Arrand, it will be seen that Galippil was relected as the Innefig point for the Anglo-French sumy. We must dwell upon the grave consi

Adrianople, and in leaving to their left the Turkish for-tresses, and even Constantinople, might be beforehand with us there, and cut off the rejrecat to our fleets en-gaged in the Black res. There was a great danger there which the foresight of the allied governments hnew how to guard spainst in time.

Another consideration also pointed out the necessity of occupying Gallipoli. At the time of the departure of the erpedition—that is to say, in April, 1854, it was anxiously asked whether our troops would arrive in time to cover Constantinople? A defensive war appear-ed then more probable than an offensive one. It was the integrity of the Ottoman empire which was man-aced and already attacked, and which we were about to detend.

defend.

A battle lost by the Turks on the Danube might have A battle lost by the Turks on the Danube might have brought the Russians in three days' march on the Balkans, and opened to them the road to Constantinople. The countain of Gallepoli entirely covered that capital. The two allied governments undertood that a Russian srmy, even if it occupied Adrianople, could not advance on Constantin ple, leaving 60,000 Anglo French on its right flank, and this was provided for in the Em-

the couparison of Gallpon entirely covered that capital. The two allied governments undertood that a Russian srmy, even if it occupied Adrianopie, could not advance on Constantinepie, leaving 60,000 Anglo French on its right flank, and this was provided for in the Emperci's instructions.

Thus, it every point of view, to be prepared for every eventuality, the peninsuls of Gallipoli was admirably relected as a landing point and basis of operations. From this point we could protect the capital of the Turkish empire. We had our fleets at our command; we cauld advance without exposure, and we kept up our communications with Toulon and Maraeilles.

But scarcely had the Anglo-French army arrived at Gallipoli when the scene changed although the Russian skimshers had been seen from Varna, the herofoldetence of citatria had stopped the ardor of Prince Gortschaseff. The struggle, instead of being carried into the heart of the empire, was prolonged on the Danube with varied chances of success. The commanders of the expedition then thought they would have time to reach the theatte of the struggle, and perhaps to save Silistria, but at all events to join the Ottoman army and to defract the Balkons against the Russians, having their wings, so to say, protected by the fortresses of Schumla and Varna.

This plan was as beld as it was prudent. It was indicated, moreover, by circumstances and by the imminance of the danger. If, so fact, the Russians had taken Solistria, the fall of which was announced as ineritable by Cmar Pasha's reports, the fate of the Ottoman empire might depend upon a great battle. It was requiring for the struggle would be decided, and the supreme decrees of interest to differ a great temptation to the army before which it it stires—damely, to pursue, but, when such pursuit may combromise an army, there is more giory in trustices and the supremental surface of the surface o

It only goes to war if it can do so. Austria was not prepared at that moment.

In breaking with Russia she wished to be certain of Germany, and have 500,600 men under arms. Her dignity, her interests, the example of the Western Powers urged her to pronounce berself and act; prudence bade her wait and collect her military forces, strengthen her political alliances, before joining in the struggle.

But what could the united Generals do at Varna after the retreat of the Russian army? Were they to remain in an inactivity which would have led to discouragement, and from which the pretige of our flag would inevitably have suffered? Neither military honor nor political interests allowed the Commander in Chief to take such a position.

such a position. Once on this great theatre, inaction was out of the question; it was necessary to act, to show our object to the troops, to compel the enemy to fear us, to excite the ambition of Europe to follow us by arousing its admiration and respect.

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tion and respect.

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An expedition against Sebastopol might hasten the denouement of the war. It had a determined and limited object; it might place in the hands of the alikes a province and a stronghold which, once conquered, would be a pledge and a means of exchange to obtain peace. It was under the influence of those considerations that the Commander-in Chief conceived the idea and decreed the execution of the plan.

This expedition having been examined at Paris and London as an eventuality, the Marshal St. Arnaudreceived them, not the instructions—they could not be given at such a dustance—but the following advice—

To obtain exact information of the strength of the Russian forces in the Crimea; if not too considerable, to land at a spot which might serve as a basis for operations. Theodosia now Kaffa) appeared the most eligible spot; although that point of the coast has the disadvantage of being distant torty leagues from Sebastopel, it nevertheless offers great advantages.

First, its bay is vast and safe; it would hold all the vasels of the equadron and the vasels with provisions for the troops. Secondly, once established on that point, it might be made a real basis for operations.

In thus occupying the eastern point of the Crimea all the reinforcements coming by the Sen of Azoff and the Cancasue could be cut off. A gradual advance could be made towards the centre of the country, taking advantage of all its resources. Supheropol, the strategic centre of the perinsuls, would be occupied.

An advance would then be made on sebastopol, and probably a great battle fought on that road. If lost, a retreat in good order on Kaffa, and nothing is compromised; if gained, to besiegs Sebastopol, to invest it completely, and its surrender would follow as a matter of course in a short interval.

But scarcely victors, they perceived they had no port to serve them as a basis for operations. Then, urged by that invincible lessinct of preservation which never decive

country unless in direct communication with the freet. Unhappily, those counsels were not followed. Be it that the Commanders-in-Chief had not sufficient troops

Unbappily, those counsels were not followed. Be it that the Commanders-in-Chief had not sufficient troops to take so long a journey in the Crimea, be it that they expected a more spessy result by a bold and suddien coup de main, they resolved, as is known, to land at a few leagues only from Sebastopel. The glorious battle of Aima at first justified their decision.

But this compulsity and necessary return towards the sea led to the abandomment of the northern heights of Sebastopel, the occupation of which alone allowed the investment of the place. The Anglo French army was not, in fact, numerous enough to make a complete investment. It was, therefore, necessary to limit it to an attack on the south side.

To accomplish this operation the Euglish took possession of the port of Balaklava; the French, seeking a point d'apput on the ahore to isnd their provisions and artillery, providentialls found the port of Kamiesoh, The soldiers, who are never deceived, call it, in fact, the pert of Providence.

Sebastopol, as is known, is not surrounded by battlements; it is rather a great intrenshed camp, containing generally an army of from 18,000 to 20,000 men, already protected at the commencement of the seige by numerous earth batteries, and especially by the Russian fleet, which, well placed in the inner port, could bear upon all the avenues by which the allies could advance upon the place.

At this period that is to say when the Anglo French

place.
At this period that is to say when the Anglo French army arrived before Schastopol, the assault might perhaps, have been attempted; but it was already a hazar-cousenterprise, without sufficient artitlery to silence

heps, have been attempted; but it was already a hazarcous enterprise, without sufficient artitlery to sileace
that of the enemy.

Benuties nothing was impossible to an Anglo-French
srmy compose of generals and men like those who
have given such proofs during the last six months in
the danger, fatigues and sufferings of this long siege;
but success alone could justify so daring an attempt.

The first duty imposed by the responsibilities of commands prudence, and gradence pre-crited to the Commanders in-Chief not to attempt to assault with, atmost, an army of to,000 men, placed on a rock, desicient
of artillery or ammunition reserves, without being defended by intrenchments in the rear, and with no other
refuge but the ships.

It would have been risking on a cast the fortune and
fate of the expedition, and nothing must be risked at a
distance of 800 lesgues from the mother country.

The coup de main which the Generals thought possible
after the battle of the Alma having escaped them, there
remained for them a regular siege according to the rules
of military art. At the very onset the Russians took
two nost ifficacions measures, very regrettable for us.

The first was Prince Menchikoff's strategy is move, who,
instead of shuting himself up in Schastopol, marched
on Simpheropel, and kept the field and free communicaton with the besieged city; the second was the energetic
decision of sinking a pertion of the man-of-war, which
rendered the enemy's porr inaccessible to our fleets,
and gave some 500 or 600 guos, with their sailors, as
gunners, to assist in the defence of the town.

Thus, although the town already presented a formidable row of guns, tew batteries rose, as if by enchuntment, and our feeble siege artilry could not master the
fire of the town.

From this moment it becams evident to all that Sebastepol could only be taken after a long straggle, with
powerful reinforcements, at the tector perhaps of cangui-

From this moment it becams evident to all that Seoa-trpol could only be taken after a long straggle, with powerful reinforcements, at the cost perhaps of rangui-nary battles. This situation was grave. It was loozed upon by the Commander-in-Chief with that calenness which elevates characters to the height of the greatest esponsibilities.

This is the place to speak of General Canrobert and o

spon by the Commander-in-Chief with that causness which elevates characters to the height of the greatest responsibilities.

This is the place to speak of General Canrobert and of Lord Raglan, as history will speak of them. Their part in this great scree has been worthy of the two countries whose swords they bear. Opposed to immense obstacles, they measured them only to triumphover them by courage, perseverance, and devotion.

The army, supported by their example, suffered without a complaint exposed to all the rigors of a terrible winter; having only poles in the earth and small tents to shield them against cold and torients of rain, they made every sacrides to the honor of their flag and to their country, and to the confidence they had in their choises, whom they learnt to love and honor on the field of battle.

To appreciate fully the immense difficulties of the enterprise conceived and executed by the commanders, it may not be out of place, perhaps, to explain in what a regular siege consists.

The siege of Sebastopal has scarcely any analogy in our millitary-feats of arms. To attack a place which is not invested, when the ecemy, superior in number, can be revictuabled and reinforced in mee, provisions and munitions of war, and when he holds the open country, is an act of ward, and when he holds the open country, is an act of ward, and when he holds the open country, is an act of ward, and when he holds the open country, is an act of ward, and when he holds the open country, is an act of ward, and when he holds the open country, is an act of ward, and when he holds the open country, is an act of ward, and when he holds the open country, is an act of ward, and when he holds the open country, is an act of ward, and when he holds the open country, is an act of ward, and when he holds the open country, is an act of ward, and when he holds the open country, is an act of ward, and when he holds the open country, is an act of ward, and when he holds the open country, is an act of ward, and when he holds the open c

The Exposition of Louis Sapoleon.

The Exposition of Louis Napoleon.

[From the London Times, April 12.

The clear, though elaborate statement of the military operations of the allied armes in the East, which has teen published by the French Government in the Monitary, will be read in all parts of the world with intense interest, for the Empesor of the French pays a not undeserved homage to the force and justice of public opision, by submitting the whole course of a carraign and an expection not yet concluded to the criticism of France, to the knowledge of our adversary, and to the judgment of foreign nations. We confess that we curselves have permed this remarkable document will a degree of satisfaction, which is increased by the unexpected discovery that the strategical opicions expressed in this journal from the commencement of these operations are identical in every 'point, save one, with the views entertained by the Prench government and its military advisers. In attempting to defend these options by such arguments as our own knowledge of the theatrs of operations and of the art of war analed us to suggest, we certainly were quite unconscious that the very same points were those on which the abinet of the Tuileries reked for the success of the expedition; but, sithough, as is apt to be the case in the conduct of military affairs, many unforessen difficulties have srisen, and the result has not yet been equal to our cardices and our expectations, we remain unshaken in our conviction that the main strategical movements of the last campaign were perfectly sound, and that, in fact, no others could reasonably have been attempted.

Our readers may remember that considerably before the exclustion was an above the nearly and that, in fact, no others could reasonably have been attempted.

dwelt upon the importance of Thracian Chersonesus as the base of our position for the defence of Constantinople and of Roumelia, which was then the p. imary object of our intervention. The instructions of the Emperor of the French to Marshal St. Arnaud, bearing date the 12th of April, 1854, exactly ohe year ago, are directed in the first instance to this point. Gallipoli was the base of operations, because, in the event of the defeat of the Turks on the Danube, and the passage of the Balkan by a Rus vian army, that force would have been outfianked by the allied troops in Thrace, and its march on the capital become impossible. At the same time the possession of the Dardanelles secured our maritime communications, which might otherwise have been threatened by the enemy. Toese preparations were purely defensive, but our position in the war was still of a defensive character. The force originally sent out consisted of about 40,000 French and 20,000 British troops, and the operations contemplated at that time were regulated by the necessity of the case and by the strength of that army. We, therefore, hold, as the French sixt meet very ably maintains, that the occupation of Gastipois was a wise and correct determination on the part of the alless under what were then the known and anticipoted circumstances against which they had to provide.

strength of test army, we, therefore, non, as the French systement very ably maintains, that the occupation of Gestipoli was a wise and correct determination on the part of the allies under what were then the known and anticipoted circumstances against which they had to provide.

But before the morth of May these circumstances had materially changed. The Russian army had crossed the Danube, occupied the Drobrudacha, and threatened the line of the Balaen. The success of this movement, however, depended on the capture of Situatria; and the gallout defecte of the Laken. The success of this movement, however, depended on the capture of Situatria; and the gallout defecte of the Balaen and the Laken Situatria and continued their advance. But the Emperor of the French had expressed in the strengest terms his resolution to avoid a march upon the Banube, and to abstain from an expedit on into the Danubian provinces, which could only have produced the most fatal results. If our memory serves us, rather less than ten months have elapsed since the British ministers, and those who shared their opinions, were exposed to a storm of obloquy because they steadily resisted the spreads made to them to throw our forces into this perilous and desperate situation.

It was felt, however, that the allied governments, having entered upon this war, could not allow their armaments to remain mantive, or neglect any means likely to bring the context to a glorious termination. This expedition to the Orimea had been regarted from the first as one of the objects to be kept in view by the allied Generals, and when the whole Russian line had retreated across the Danube, and even beyond the Prath, the Taurio Fesiansila was obviously the fittest field for the operations of the maritime Powers.

The French government, however, appears to have experiesed at an early period its preference for Kaiffa as the base of operations on the Crimean coast, and something like a reproach is cast upon the allied Generals for having the allied of the summary of t

The errors committed have occurred much more in the execution of the plan than in the conception of it. We regret that at certain times and apportunities a vigorous attempt was not made to defeat the releving army of the enemy; whereas this Freech statement admits that we had no army of observation at all. We stress the universal artenishment at the manner in which the stege has been conducted—the art mot to cover upwards of 20 miles of works and approaches—the delay which occurred in the flist instance—when an attack was possible—the neglect of all means to anticipate and destroy the works of the enemy, rising, as if by magic, before our eyes—and the astocishing bisnoness which suffered the Russians to occupy and fortify the Mamelon, which is the key of their position, although it is situated 100 yards nearer to the French lines than to their own. These are some of the causes which have frustrated the nege, all of which may be summed up in one sentence—that the Russians have shown more science, strength, and incention in their mode of defence than the allied forces in their mode of alcience than the allied forces in their mode of alcence than the allied forces in their mode of alcence than the allied forces in their mode of alcence than the allied forces in their mode of alcence than the allied forces in their mode of alcence than the allied forces in their mode of alcence than the allied forces in their mode of alcence than the allied forces in their mode of alcence that the allied forces in their mode of alcence there there were presented to the enemy. Agreed of the tent to the disadvantage of the enemy. sings at an one ingliest activement of the art of war is to take advantage of those difficulties for oneself and to turn them to the disadvantage of the enemy. Agreeiog, therefore, in the main with this French statement as to the strategical operations of the campaign, we cannot assent to its defence of the technical operations of the

assent to its defence of the technical operations of the siege.

It seems, on the contrary, to have turned out that the alled armies are weakest precisely in those ocient in departments on which we relied with the greatest conficence; and, having exhausted the skill of our engineers, it is now intimated that the armies have the rescurce of taking the field. We sincerely hope that this decision, which we have now streamously acrosted for more than a month, has at last leen taken; but without more energy of command and vigor of in vention than have hitherto been shown by the generals it is impossible to carry on successful warfare.

The Manifesio and the Vienna Conference.

(Paris (April 11—6 P. M.) Correspondence of the Times.]

The great went of to-day in Paris is the article in the Moniteur, the sense of which I was enabled to give in a few word yesterday. It will be followed by another, equally if not still more interesting, on the political, as this is on the military question. The article is generally attributed, and I have some reason to suspect with truth, to M. A. de Laguerronisre, but it bears evident marks of having been touched by the hand of the Emperor, particularly in the scientific or technical purts. That the tose of this article is warlike cannot be doubted, but the impression produced in high political quarters is, that the plan of military operations hitherto foi lowed is about to be modified, otherwise the vastness of the undertaking, as against Sebastopol, and the superiority of the Russians in position and makerial, would hardly be dwell on so much. As I observed yesterday, the desire to disengage, or rather cover, the responsibility of the Fimperor is manifest throughout; and the faults in strategy that have been committed are to be imputed to others than himself.

We may, I suppose, assume it as correct that the instructions, of which extracts are given, were really communicated to Marshal St. Arnaud; they will tell on the army, and there is little doubt they are intended to do the aimy, and there is little doubt they are intended to others than himself.

Some believe the theatre will be in another part of the Crimes; others that the troops will embark and proceed to warres Odessa, and that the warrield as to the locality.

Some believe the theatre will be in another part of the Crimes; others that the troops will embark and proceed towers Odessa, and that the war will be carried on in the southern provinces of Sussia, under tha direction of the Emperor himself.

I am not aware that any news of a kind to be relied on has come from Vienna to day. I may mention, however, that the will be carried on in the southern pr

on those shores to call upon her, who has, to reduce her forces.

It is thought certain that France and England will persist in demanding such simitations, and that on this no concession will be made. When neither party yields, of course the Conference must break up, and there are people have who confidently affirm that M. Drouyn de l'Huys will be in Paris on Saturday or Sunday, but not with ponce. I know only of one person of smimence who inclines to an opposite opinion, but I do not know the reason of his holding it.

The race announced to take place yesterday afternoon between Angeliae, Union, and May Fly, was postponed on account of the weather. At the hour appointed t start, a great number of persons were on the ground, and were quite disappointed when it was ascertained that the horses would not start. A few of the gentlemen present offered to make up a purse for the horses to troh for, rather than return without witnessing a race. The owner of May Fly was willing to start, but

A match was made at Woodruff's yesterday afternoon between g. g. Mark Maguire, and bay mare Angeline, for \$500 aside, to go as they please, three weeks hence.

Board of Aldermen. The Board met last evening, Isaac O. Barker, Esq., Pre-THE REPORT ON THE NATIVITY OF THE POLICE.

On the reading of the minutes of the last meeting Alderman HERRICK moved to amend the minutes by inserting before the report of "The Special Committee appointed to investigate the accuracy of the report made by the Chief of Police," &c., the words," John H. Briggs, one of the Special Committee." The correction was ac cepted, the report being a minority report, and signed by one member of the committee only. We deem it unnecessary to publish the report, as it is a mere recepitulation of the evidence taken before the committee and already fully published. Yeveral petitions for the correction and remission of tax 3s were received and referred. Communications were received from the Chief Engineer of the Fire Depart-ment, with complaints against several of the members. Referred to the Committee of the Fire Department, the Committee of the Fire Department of the Committee of the Fire Department of the Committee of the Fire Department of the Committee of the size Department of the Committee of the size Department to refer resolution the lating to the election of Assistant Engineers to the Board of Forenza of that department, was adopted. Several payers from the Board of Councilmen were repointed to investigate the accuracy of the report made

report of the Committee of the wire Bepartment to refer resolutio trelative to the election of Assistant Engineers to the Board of Forense of that department, was adopted. Several payers from the Board of Councilmen were received and referred.

WIND FROM THE MAYOR.

The following commitment from his honor the Mayor, enclosing an opinion from the Corporation Counsilers of the Wayor, enclosing an opinion from the Corporation Counsilers of the Mayor, enclosing an opinion from the Corporation Counsilers of the Mayor, was read and ordered on file:

MAYON'S OWNICE New York, April 25, 1855.

To THE HON, THE BOARD OF ADDRIBURY.

GENTLEMENT—I PROPERTURY BE BEARD OF ADDRIBURY AND HOLD THE City Serveyors of this city with the resolution originating in your Board, appending John B. Wassworth one of the City Serveyors of this city with out my signature, and for refer to the accompanying opinion of the Counsel to the Corporation as turnishing the grounds upon which my objection is based. I have examined the opinion of the connect on special city Serveyors, as expectfully.

OUTLOS OF COUNSEL TO COMMITTEE WAS DEPENDENCE, as a composition of the ment of the Counsel Counsel, and agree with him that the Committee of the Street Counsels of the Serveyors, and applied the Serveyors, and opinion whether the Commissioner, have the right to appoint City Serveyors, and have the bound to reply: The 19th section of the Street Commissioner, have the right to appoint City Serveyors, and have the bound to reply: The 19th century the Counsel, by the general ordinance of 20th May, the Counsel Cou

where a man had been presented by the workmen with a watch valued at \$125, but it was given him by their own volition.

Alderman Drakk said he knew what Alderman Tucker siluded to, but he (Ald. D.) also knew that Alderman C. H. Tucker, with some friends, went into the house of a man on runday and drank a gin sling, and then came down to the Mayor's office and informed him of the fact. Alderman C. H. Tucker could not permit such an assertion to pass without pronouncing it false.

Alderman C. H. Tucker could not permit such an assertion to pass without pronounce to be a liar. Alderman Wakhman came to the rescue by speaking in favor of Mr. Hall, and said that if a present was made to bim, it must have have been given voluntary by the men under his charge. Alderman Harnick said that he knew that men whose families were quartered in the Almshouse during the wister, were obliged to pay these superintendents on the public works \$1 each on their second receipt of vages; that the money was exacted ostensibly to bu, a watch for the superintendent, and thus the tax is levied on each new man until the work is completed.

Alderman W. Tucker bened the resolution would mass.

isken in, and thus the tax is levied on each new man until the work is completed.

Alforman W. Tucken hoped the resolution would pass; he believed that this system was carried on in all the departments, and he thought it would be well to pass this recolution, and follow it up by similar motions respecting the other departments.

Alderman Howard-would not oppose the resolution, though he could not see what good it could do He thought they might turn nearer home and make such

though he could not see what good it could do He thought they might turn nearer home and make such inquiries.

Alderman Voorhies—Did you ever get any?
Alderman Howards—Did you ever get any?
Alderman Howards—Not the first red cent. There never was any one thought him worth it, though he had known a member of the Common Council who received a prerentation worth \$500 or \$1,400.

The resolution was acopted.

The resolution was acopted.

A communication was received from Sheriff Orser, stating that he had on several occasions called the attention of the Board to the necessity or making additional security and attentions in Eddfidge street jail. The recent escape of two prisoners from that building forced him again to urge the absolute necessity of making the prison more secure. Referred to Committee on Repairs and Supplies.

Alexantion of the Board of Councilmen, awarding the sum of \$1,000 to David T. Valentine, Clerk of the Common Council, as a compensation for the masterly manner in which be has edited the New York Manual for the current year—selfecting the highest credit on the author, both as a compler and historian was nanimously concurred in.

"SAM," INDIGNANT, WANTS MORE POWER.

Alderman BRIGGS offered the following:—

Wisreas, The Special Committee has been grossly insulted, and their power defied by Wim. McKellar, Mr. Matell's chief clerk; therefore, Bereived, That the Special Committee, consisting of Aldermen Briggs, C. H. Tucker and Hoffure, (which was appointed to ascertain the truthfulness of George W. Matsell's chief clerk; therefore, provided to secretain the truthfulness of George W. Matsell's chief clerk; therefore prover the imprisement of policemen, ba, and they are hereby empowered to investigate all frauds and doctron in every branch of the Police Department, and also the manner in which it is and has been conducted, in addition to the power they passes by a previous resolution.

Alderman Herrick asked was it intended to pass Alderman Bridgs—I move its adoption
Alderman Krilly moved that it lay on the table.
Alcerman Howard seconded the mation to lay on the table.
The motion to lay on the table was put and lost, by a of 12 to 6.

table.

The motion to lay on the table was put and lost, by a of 12 to 0.

Alderman Herrick thought that after the preamble they should insert that "Mr McKellar ought to be reprimanded, and be ashemed of himself." (Laughter.) Alderman Kelly hoped that neither the resolution more amendment would be adopted. He had hoped that the committee had gone far enough. He submitted that Mr. McKellar had not offered any insult to the committee; he had answered every question that the committee were empowered by the resolution of his Board to ask. He had only refused to respond to irrelevant questions. Alderman Herrick as to be never saw a committee so eager for power, but he thought they had got power enough already.

Alderman Herrick as to be never saw a committee so eager for power, but he thought they had got power enough already.

Alderman Kelly moved that the resolution be referred to the Law Committee. (Laughter.)

Alderman Kelly accepted the amendment, which being put, was lost by a vote of 12 to 6.

Alderman Herrick's amendment was put, and lost by a similar vote.

The previous question being put, was carried by a vote of 11 to 7.

Alderman Makeman moved a reconsideration of the question, as he old not deem it proper to be on the occords for he, as a lawyer, would acvise Mr. McKellar that he was justified in refusing to answer those bree levent questions which had been put to him.

Motion to reconsider was lost, otherwise Mr. McKellar prohibition of selling cysters during the summer months take place from the first of July instead of the first of May, as ordered by the city ordinance. Adopted.

After some other business the Board adjourned to the first Monday in May.

United States District Court. April 26.-The Grand Jury, of which Luther C. Carler, Faq., was foreman, were sacrod ut and day, for the trans-